The Inaction of the United Nations in the War Against Iran and the Historical Shift from Rules to Bilateral Agreements

نویسندگان

1 PhD student in International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran

doi
10.22034/iruns.2026.573087.1215
چکیده

The international system that emerged after the Second World War was founded upon a rule-based and ‎institutional framework in which the United Nations and the Security Council were positioned at the core as ‎guarantors of collective peace and security. Although this order consistently operated under the shadow of power ‎politics, it nevertheless provided, for decades, a shared framework for restraining the use of force and regulating ‎state behavior. Developments over the past two decades, however, indicate that this legal shield has gradually ‎eroded, giving way to an ambiguous, interpretive, and power-centered order, one in which rules are less binding ‎norms than instruments contingent upon the will and interests of dominant powers.‎By examining the conceptual transition from treaty-based international law to a so-called “rules-based ‎international order,” and by analyzing the structural inefficiencies of the Security Council, this article ‎demonstrates how traditional multilateral diplomacy has lost its deterrent capacity in addressing contemporary ‎security crises, particularly in the Middle East. Israel’s attack on Iranian territory and the Security Council’s ‎inaction in response serve as a concrete test case that exposes this institutional erosion and highlights the ‎limitations of relying exclusively on international legal mechanisms. The article ultimately argues that within ‎such an order, national security and state interests have become increasingly dependent on bilateral diplomacy and ‎contractual network-building; in the absence of such infrastructure, Iran faces the risk of deepening structural ‎isolation within the international system.‎