Examining the Argument of Non-Causal Effect of Moral Properties and its Use against Moral Realism
نویسندگان
1 Assistant professor, University of Qom (Department of Moral Philosophy)
2 Phd student, Department of ethics, Faculty of Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran,
doi
10.30470/er.2023.559732.1154چکیده
One of the arguments that is put forward both for and against strong moral realism is the argument for the causal effects of moral properties; Whether moral properties have a causal effect on the external and physical world to prove their reality or not. The first who argue thist was Gilbert Harman, who considered moral properties to have no causal effects. Shafer-Landau has also obtained an ontological account of it and examined it. In this article, we examine the arguments of Harman and Landau and the drawbacks that have been made to them, and the result is that the arguments of those who consider moral properties to have no causal effects have significant drawbacks and are not defensible. Explanations can also be used to defend the causal effects of moral properties and to use them to the benefit of realism.
