An evolutionary game theory approach for financing in a financially-constrained supply chain
نویسندگان
1 Faculty of Engineering, University of Isfahan, 81746-73411, Iran
doi
چکیده
This research uses an evolutionary game-theoretic model to investigate the long-term effects of financing in a supply chain (SC) including a one-population of financially-constrained manufacturers and one well-funded e-tailer. The e-tailer and the manufacturers decide on selling price decisions. The manufacturers can either choose a financing scheme from the e-tailer or not. Hence, each manufacturer has two strategies: financing from the e-tailer or non-financing. Considering the two strategies of the manufacturers, this study investigates three strategy profiles in basic and evolutionary game theoretic models. Through the evolutionary game theoretical model, an evolutionary stable strategy solution is determined implying the long-term strategy implemented by most of the manufacturers. Also, numerical analyses are provided to examine the effectiveness of the proposed models. Our result demonstrates that most of the manufacturers (about 71%) will implement the non-financing strategy in the long term suggesting innovative or hybrid financing schemes to financially-constrained manufacturers. Moreover, our result indicates that as the interest rate of the e-tailer increases (about 70%), the manufacturers and the e-tailer offer higher prices to customers. Also, the result shows that when pricing competition is high (about 2.2), all competing SC actors (the manufacturers and the e-tailer) gain more benefits.