Modeling Stock Price Synchronization via Institutional Investor Behavior: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach
نویسندگان
1 Department of Accounting ,Tabriz Branch,Islamic Azad University,Tabriz,iran
2 Department of Accounting ,Tabriz Branch,Islamic Azad University,Tabriz,iran
3 Department of Accounting ,Tabriz Branch,Islamic Azad University,Tabriz,iran
4 Department of Economics,Tabriz Branch,Islamic Azad University,Tabriz,iran
doi
چکیده
This paper presents a stock price synchronization model based on institutional investor behavior using evolutionary game theory, with a specific focus on the Tehran Stock Exchange as a representative emerging market. Factors influencing investor decisions include potential gains or losses and the economic costs associated with their behavior. The evolutionary game model analyzes dynamic equations and simulates evolutionary equilibrium strategies under various conditions. The analysis reveals that operational costs for institutional investors, the cost of gathering information before trading, and anticipated losses are key factors affecting the evolutionary game system between institutional and individual investors. Additionally, reducing market speculation and increasing investors' access to information—through enhanced performance of institutional investors and strengthened market information disclosure mechanisms—are effective in decreasing stock price synchronization in the market. The choice of the Tehran Stock Exchange for this research highlights its unique characteristics and position as an emerging market, providing a valuable context to examine the impact of institutional investor behavior on market stability.
