فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

This paper extends the classical Capital Market Line (CML) framework by incorporating strategic interactions between international investors and host countries through a game-theoretic model. The extended model introduces key behavioral and institutional variables, notably the degree of hostility (ρ), economic power asymmetry, and relative risk-return dynamics across domestic and foreign markets. The investor seeks optimal capital allocation based on expected return and perceived risk, while the host country aims to retain capital by enhancing domestic market attractiveness and minimizing political hostility. The equilibrium analysis shows that the investor’s decision is highly sensitive to relative returns and external risk, while the host country’s utility is most affected by the degree of hostility and its relative economic power. The results confirm that minimizing political antagonism and enhancing institutional cooperation significantly increases domestic utility and stabilizes capital inflows. Ultimately, this paper provides a more realistic and dynamic interpretation of the CML by integrating macro-financial and geopolitical dimensions, and it suggests that peaceful economic diplomacy and sound macroeconomic policies are crucial for sustainable investment and trade flows.