حکم فقهی سلب حیات از جنین‌های آزمایشگاهی

نویسندگان

1 استاد دانشکده الهیات پردیس فارابی، دانشگاه تهران، قم، ایران. (نویسنده مسؤول)

2 دانشجوی دکترای فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشگاه بوعلی همدان، همدان، ایران

doi
10.22037/mfj.v11i39-38.26146
چکیده

Background and Aim: A fetus that develops normally is subject to such rules as the sanctity of abortion. The jurists agree that abortion is a crime and depending on how long the sperm has entered the mother's womb and the steps taken, the offender must pay blood money. This study aims to investigate the possibility of spreading natural abortion rulings on embryos in vitro based on jurisprudential sources and documents. Materials and Methods: The present analytical descriptive study has been written using library data, both real and cyber. Thus, first of all, the reasons that can be cited in Imami jurisprudential sources regarding abortion has been planned and then by analytical method it has been tried to examine the possibility of spreading the rules of natural abortion to the embryos in vitro abortion. In this regard, since the most important document of these rulings are narrations that express the sanctity of abortion, these narrations have been studied and by examining the word embryo in them and also the way or subject of its formation, the possibility of inclusion of narrations in relation to embryos in vitro is measured. Conclusion: Studies have shown that among the jurists regarding the deprivation of life of embryos produced by abnormal fertilization, two theories of permissibility and impermissibility have been proposed. By the review of the documents of the two theories, it appears that the reasons for deprivation of life impermissibility are more certain and strong. Then there is no difference between an embryo in vitro and a natural embryo in deprivation of life. Destroying the embryos in vitro is not permissible as well as the naturall embryos, unless in special cases that the secondary titles require otherwise.