فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

Descartes grounded modern epistemology in the thinking subject, while Hume denied the enduring self, viewing it as a collection of fleeting perceptions. Though Hume’s critique dismantled Cartesian assumptions, it also opened the path for Kant’s redefinition of the self on rational grounds. This article explores how the self, despite losing its presumed original unity, retains its essential role in volition and experience. Kant’s critical philosophy reveals that the spontaneity of the subject—irreducible to causal explanation—requires investigation within practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Beginning with purposiveness as the basis for reflective judgment, the self emerges as a cognitive, moral, and artistic agent. It synthesizes sensory input to form knowledge, legislates moral norms through free will, and expresses creative force in aesthetic production. By integrating Kant’s critiques into a unified framework, this interpretation shows that post-Kantian philosophy no longer treats the self as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic, future-oriented agent of self-activity. The transcendental ego, though not an object of knowledge, functions as the condition for cognition, moral autonomy, and aesthetic creativity—marking a shift from metaphysical substance to active principle.