فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

Towards all humans, just in virtue of their mere humanity, we have a minimum of duties; e.g., the duty not to harm them. These are ‘general’ duties. Towards some people we also have ‘special’ duties because of the interactions (for example, a promise we have made to them) that have arisen between us and them but not between us and others. Both of these kinds of duty are grounded in general moral principles, with the difference that in the general principles that are related to special duties some interaction is included. Do we, in addition to the aforementioned kinds of duty, also have ‘duties of partiality’ toward those with whom we have ‘relations,’ duties that are grounded in the goods of the relations, not in general moral principles? This essay aims at defending an affirmative answer to this question; some of our duties to our children, parents, etc., are to them as our children, our parents, etc. The method of the essay is to investigate the elements and the structure of the reduction of duties of partiality to special duties, to critique an important arguement in its favour, and to defend the elements and the structure of nonreduction of duties of partiality to special duties and to put forward some arguements in its favour. Briefly, I have concluded that reducing duties of partiality is not plausible enough and, in contrast, nonreducing them is a view that at least not only deserves considering but also have sufficient plausibility.