فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

This article, drawing upon Socrates' arguments in Plato's dialogues and Karl Popper's critical rationalism, demonstrates that adherence to systematic rational norms—including epistemic humility, cognitive responsibility, and internal coherence—necessarily leads to ethical commitment. In response to Aristotle's critique of "akrasia" (weakness of will), we show that process-oriented rationality—unlike static knowledge—can bridge the gap between "knowing" and "acting."In the first section, through a re-examination of the Protagoras dialogue, Socrates' defense of the equivalence between knowledge and virtue is reconstructed within Popper's framework of critical rationality. Here we establish that critical rationality serves not merely as an instrument for truth discovery but as a framework for moral obligation. Subsequently, by analyzing Popper's concept of "epistemic humility" in philosophy of science, we prove that accepting fallibility necessitates commitment to transparency and accountability. Aristotle's historical challenge is addressed through introducing "rationality as process," revealing that akrasia stems from deficiencies in rational systems rather than an inherent separation between reason and will. The study's objective is to reinterpret the works of Socrates, Aristotle, and Popper with focus on the concepts of "rationality" and "commitment." The article concludes that the unity of reason and ethics constitutes not an abstract ideal but an achievable goal—provided we conceptualize rationality as an institutional process (rather than merely an individual one).