فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

Utilitarianism, one of the most prominent theories in normative ethics, has long been criticized for its guiding principle of “maximizing benefit for the greatest number.” Among its various philosophical challenges, the alleged conflict between utilitarianism and moral intuitions—particularly in matters of distributive justice and fundamental human rights—has drawn significant attention. Critics argue that utilitarian reasoning often violates deeply held moral intuitions, while utilitarians have responded either by reinterpreting the notion of moral intuition or by questioning its intrinsic authority. This study argues that findings from cognitive science offer a new framework for addressing this debate. Drawing on research in moral psychology, it develops three lines of response: (1) Distinguishing between intuitive (fast, unconscious) and reasoning-based (slow, deliberate) moral processes reveals that prioritizing one without a compelling justification is unwarranted; (2) According to the “unity of heuristics and moral intuitions” theory, moral intuitions themselves rely on cognitive heuristic mechanisms, undermining their privileged epistemic status; and (3) If the mere existence of moral intuitions supports theories aligned with them, then the presentation of utilitarian intuitions neutralizes the core argument for the incompatibility of utilitarianism and moral intuitions. The paper thus reframes the dispute in light of cognitive science, offering a more nuanced basis for evaluating utilitarian ethics.