Reconsidering Moral Realism and Unrealism in Light of Cognitive Neuroscience Findings: Richard Joyce’s Perspective
نویسندگان
1 Associate professor, Department of Ethics, Qom University, Qom, Iran
2 Ph.D Student in Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
doi
10.30470/er.2024.2011545.1249چکیده
The conflict between realism and non-realism was and is one of the most important fundamental issues of metaethics. In the meantime, rationalism has been introduced as the full representative of realism and emotionalism as the main symbol of unrealism. One of the new fields that can play a role in this controversy is neuroscience, which by empirically examining the function of reason and emotion in the process of moral judgment and action, may enter the field for or against each of these two. Richard Joyce is the one who tried to show that these findings neither support sentimentalism nor seriously harm rationalism. He answers the critics' attacks by examining the types of rationalism. Meanwhile, the discussions of Jonathan Hyde and Joshua Green as defenders of emotionalism and as a result of non-realism under the findings of cognitive neuroscience on the one hand and Joyce's analysis of the possibility of adhering to realism from the path of rationalism, on the other hand, provide a new approach to express a constructionist view of realism which is coincidentally in line with the views of Muslim philosophers (or at least some of them).