فهرست نشریات علمی دسترسی آزاد ایران

Analyzing the meaning and origin of the oughts of practical reason is one of the key topics in understanding and analyzing human action, as well as in meta-ethical topics. Allameh Tabataba'i considers these necessities to be contingent perceptions that are an intermediary between man and his will or decision. Some philosophers such as Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi and Ayatollah Amoli Larijani have criticized this view. In this article, we intend to first show that such contingent perceptions exist and that not all practical reason’s oughts can be explained with [metaphysical] relative necessity. Secondly, if Allameh's claim is presented in a partial way, the criticisms raised will be removed. Thirdly, it is possible to present a new explanation of the formation of these contingent perceptions, which makes both its semantics and the way it affects the human will more obvious.